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COMMENT FROM AN ENFORCEMENT
PERSPECTIVE
Michael P. Dooleyt
I completely endorse Professor Macey's acknowledgment of
Henry Manne's contribution to the insider trading debate. While
Macey's paper concentrates on the substantive law of insider trading,
this essay focuses on the enforcement aspect of insider trading and
particularly the relationship of the enforcement process to the under-
lying substantive goals of the law being enforced. Once again,
Manne gets the credit for being the first to recognize the importance
of the enforcement issue. In what is almost a throw-away line in his
Insider Trading and the Law Professors article, Manne recognized
that "a number of aspects of the insider trading debate turn on the ef-
ficiency with which a rule against such trading can be enforced."1
In my mind, the history of insider trading during the last nearly
forty years is a classic case study in how the enforcement process can
come to dominate a legal rule with poorly defined substantive goals.
My designation of a forty-year history is important because I disagree
with the timeline suggested by Professor Macey's paper. There is
absolutely no evidence in the legislative history of section 10(b) or
accounts of the SEC's adoption of Rule lOb-5 eight years later that
either Congress or the Commission was even thinking about insider
trading as a target of the statute or the rule.2 Moreover, it is quite im-
possible to read "insider trading" or "disclose-or-abstain" into the
language of either the statute or the rule. Even section 16(b), which
appears facially to be relevant, is not concerned with "insider trading"
in the modern sense. Rather, it is concerned with short-term trading
by designated insiders and reflects Congress' overwhelming concern
in 1934 with "manipulation" and "speculation," not the use of private
information.
3
t William S. Potter Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
1 Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 554
(1970).
2 See Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 68 VA. L. REV. 1,
56-59 (1980) (noting that the hearings preceding the 1934 Securities Exchange Act focused on
insiders' participation in pools intended to manipulate the stock of their corporations, not on
insiders' exploitation of an informational advantage).
3 See id. at 57-58.
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Insider trading was not created by statute. It is, instead, a crea-
ture of the common law that has been developed at the behest of a
governmental agency seeking to justify an expansion of its jurisdic-
tion beyond the limits initially set by Congress in the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. Although this may be attributing too much in-
sight, it is arguable that the Commission was aware that it was
straining, if not straying beyond, its legislative boundaries in In re-
Cady, Roberts & Co.,4 in which the Commission "discovered" that it
had been given authority to regulate insider trading twenty-seven
years earlier. Chairman Cary explained that the duty to refrain from
trading on inside information,
rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a rela-
tionship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such in-
formation knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing.
5
The explanation is incoherent: it is unlawful to take property from A
because it would be unfair to B. But what is B's claim to A's prop-
erty, and what does the second part of this test have to do with the
first? Why isn't the actus reus completed by the wrongful taking of
another's property? The answers to these questions are easy: the sec-
ond part of this test has nothing to do with the first part, the wrongful
act is the unauthorized use of the corporation's property, but the
Commission needed to posit some injury to investors in order to jus-
tify its assertion of jurisdiction.
Dean Manne was the first to pick up on this weakness in the in-
vestor-welfare arguments in favor of prohibiting insider trading, and I
still believe he has the better of the argument. Notwithstanding the
possible effects on spreads or price-sensitive traders6 pointed out in
Professor Macey's paper, insider trading has never had much to do
4 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 34-6668, 40 S.E.C. 907 (Nov. 8, 1961).
5 Id. at 912 (citation omitted).
6 The argument that price-sensitive traders may be misled by unexplained changes in an
issuer's share price and induced to trade the wrong way is not entirely convincing. The most
"price sensitive" traders are likely to be market professionals who are certainly aware of the
possibility of insider trading and who are thus likely to take insider trading into account as a
possible cause of otherwise unexplained increases or decreases in share price. This is certainly
true of the most fertile source of insider trading opportunities: pre-announcement leaks of a
proposed merger or takeover. The next largest category of price sensitive traders are day-traders
who, by definition, are unconcerned with changes in long-term fundamentals and close out their
positions on a daily basis.
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with investor welfare.7 Once one assumes satisfaction of the first part
of the In re Cady, Roberts & Co. test, that is, that there is a corporate
purpose for keeping the information in question secret, it becomes
apparent that there is no causal connection between the "losses"
claimed by outsiders and the insider's trading Insiders are incidental
participants in a zero-sum game between outsiders that would go on
without them.
Unfortunately, the continuing debate over whether outside in-
vestors are harmed or benefited by insider trading has tended to
crowd out more mature consideration of whether there are other, le-
gitimate reasons for regulating insider trading. I think there are and,
once again, Manne was the first to point to one of them. Manne's
principal argument was that insider trading was primarily a matter of
contract between the corporation and its officers and directors. The
parties might or might not agree to the use of confidential information
as a form of compensation. But to see the case for insider trading
regulation, we need to take one additional step backward to consider
the foundation of contract: property rights. The failure to realize that
insider trading is really concerned with property rights has led to a
second failure. The lack of a property rights analysis fails to appreci-
ate that what we regard as the single offense of "insider trading" actu-
ally involves two distinctly different acts, involving two distinctly
different sorts of actors, and implicating two distinctly different
regulatory responses. The exemplars of these types are Texas Gulf
Sulphur9 on the one hand, and Chiarellal° on the other. Texas Gulf
Sulphur is a compensation case. Chiarella is a simple case of theft.
To see how things might have played out from a property rights
perspective, we need to assume different behavior by the agency
charged with administering the law. So imagine a world in which
administrative agencies do not constantly seek to expand their juris-
diction and instead adhere faithfully to their legislative grant of
authority, returning to the legislature to make a principled case for the
expansion of their jurisdiction.
How might such an agency have responded to the Texas Gulf
Sulphur episode? The agency might have sought new authority, but it
is more likely that it would have relied on its existing authority under
7 See Jonathan Macey, Securities Trading: A Contractual Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES.
L REv. 269,274 (1999).
e See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976) (finding that "[investors
must be prepared to accept the risk of trading in an open market without complete or always
accurate information. Defendants' trading did not alter plaintiffs' expectations when they sold
their stock, and in no way influenced plaintiffs' trading decision").
9 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
10 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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the proxy rules. Taking its cue from state corporation law, the agency
would have realized that the common law has always adopted a
hands-off approach with regard to the amount of explicit compensa-
tion paid to corporate executives. However, the agency has also taken
a strict stance against hidden forms of implicit compensation and re-
quired divestiture of corporate opportunities, disgorgement of profits
made from unauthorized use of corporate property and the like."
This arrangement of rules-lenient with regard to explicit compensa-
tion and strict with regard to secret compensation-is eminently sen-
sible. Shareholders are the best judges of the value of their execu-
tives' contributions to the corporation and are entitled to know how
much they are paid. Shareholders might well, as Manne argued, be
indifferent to the forms of compensation, but they would certainly be
interested in the total amount of compensation paid to executives in
addition to their announced salaries and bonuses.
Since the SEC already had the authority to require disclosure of
compensation, they had ample grounds on which to prosecute Texas
Gulf Sulphur as a violation of the proxy rules.12 Subsequently, and
without straining its authority, the agency might have amended the
disclosure regulations under the proxy rules to require an ex ante an-
nouncement by the corporation as to whether insiders would be per-
mitted to trade on inside information together with some sort of ex
post settling up by the insiders themselves. As far as penalties are
concerned, the monetary remedy most often sought by the SEC in its
early days, disgorgement of profits, seems about right. Given that
bona fide insiders are an easily identified group, the costs of detection
are quite low, the probability of apprehension and punishment are
quite high, and a relatively low nominal sanction seems appropriate.
This way of proceeding, while well within the boundaries of estab-
lished law, would not have generated the headlines that the agency
sought in its well-publicized quest to "conquer" insider trading.
From Chiarella on, it became apparent that the enforcement
strategy followed in and from Texas Gulf Sulphur would no longer
work.1 3 This was so because Chiarella marked the emergence of a
new type of insider trader, the information thief, later epitomized by
Ivan Boesky. These actors generally had no known connection to the
corporate issuer and appropriated its proprietary information through
" See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 677 (1995) ("As a
general rule, American courts have treated compensation as a matter of business judgement ....
On the other hand... a large part of the Duty of Loyalty seems to be concerned with discour-
aging secret, 'implicit' forms of compensation.").
12 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-7-a-8 (1998).
13 See Dooley, supra note 2, at 73 (discussing practical and theoretical problems of en-
forcement in the wake of Chiarella).
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theft, bribery of employees, and other corrupt means. Unlike the po-
tential compensatory value of insider trading for corporate executives,
this use of information has no redeeming social value and imposes
real costs on the corporate owner of the information. The fact that
this new band of information thieves had no known connection to the
issuer and frequently took elaborate precautions to cover its trail
greatly complicated the SEC's detective task and decreased the prob-
ability of actual punishment to such an extent that available sanctions
afforded virtually no deterrence.1
4
Was this ajob for the SEC? Yes, not because the theft of corpo-
rate information harmed uninformed traders but because the invari-
able scene of the crime was the stock market, a venue where the
SEC's monitoring experience and ability to commandeer the re-
sources of the exchanges and the NASD give it a comparative advan-
tage in policing. From an enforcement perspective, an increase in the
nominal sanction for insider trading seemed necessary if there was to
be any deterrent effect on the information thief. The 1984 and ITS-
FEA acts sharply increased the sanctions for insider trading, but did
nothing to define and justify the de facto expansion of the SEC's ju-
risdiction and, most shamefully, did not even bother to define "insider
trading." As a result, the SEC now has at its disposal an array of
fierce penalties, to be imposed at its discretion on whomever strikes
its fancy.
I am not suggesting that the SEC discriminates in its selection of
enforcement targets. I am suggesting that publicity and other consid-
erations that appear likely to advance the agency's interests often de-
termine its choice of an enforcement target.1 5 One consequence of
this has been continuing doubt over the permissible limits of analysts'
attempts to obtain useful information from issuers.
So, we are basically back where we started with an ill-defined
law with hazily defined goals. Contrary to the Palsgrave Diction-
ary entry and The Economist article quoted in Professor Macey's
paper, the fault lies not in Henry Manne's failure to convince leg-
islators and regulators of his views.16 The fault lies in their failure
to engage and debate seriously the basic issues that Manne coura-
geously raised in 1966.
14 See DOOLEY, supra note 11, at 840-44 (describing the complex investigation that
eventually led to the conviction of Ivan Boesky and arguing that, because the SEC had already
maximized the probability that an offender would be caught, additional deterrence was only
available through increased sanctions).
15 See Stephen Bainbridge, Note, A Critique of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,
71 VA. L REv. 455, 467 (1985) (explaining the SEC's "big bang" enforcement theory).
16 See Macey, supra note 7, at 288.

